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We consider a principal-agent problem where the principal wishes to be endorsed by
a sequence of agents, but cannot truthfully reveal type. In the standard "herding"
model, the agents learn from each other’s decisions, which can lead to cascades on a
given decision when later agents’ private information is swamped. We augment the
standard model to allow the principal to subject herself to a test designed to provide
public information about her type. She must decide how tough a test to attempt from
a continuum of test types, which involves trading oﬀ the higher probability of passing
an easier test against the greater impact from passing a tougher test. We ﬁnd that the
principal will always choose to be tested, and will prefer a tough test to a neutral or easy
one.
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1. Introduction
When a ﬁrm develops a new product, it will often consider where to send it for pre-launch review
or accreditation. A job applicant facing a sequence of interviews must select suitable referees. Film
studios decide who to invite to pre-launch viewings and premieres. A politician may wish to leak a new
policy to the media, and has a choice of which media outlet to target. A ﬁrm launching an initial public
oﬀering can choose from auditors of diﬀerent reputations to review its accounts. The list goes on. In
each case a principal ultimately wants to sell products, win votes, or generally be endorsed by a group
of agents, and has the option of being publicly tested before seeking endorsement. Despite the powerful
eﬀects that success or failure of such a test may have on the performance of the principal, the literature
has paid little attention to the role of such public testing, especially the decision that a principal must
make when a variety of tests are available which diﬀer in their degree of toughness. The present paper
attempts to correct for this omission.
The principal is assumed to be either good or bad for agents, who need to estimate the relative
likelihood of the two types before making their endorsement decision. The agents decide in sequence
and are granted three sources of information. As in the standard “herding” model, they receive private
information, which perhaps relates to prior experience of the principal or her product or policies, and
can observe each other’s endorsement decisions in an attempt to learn something about other agents’
private information. The sequential nature of decision-making can allow cascades on a given decision to
develop when later agents’ private information is swamped by the information revealed by the decisions
of earlier agents. We introduce a third source of information by allowing the principal to subject
herself to a test designed to provide public information about her type before any agent has made his
endorsement decision. She must decide how tough a test to attempt from a continuum of test types,
which involves trading oﬀ the higher probability of passing an easier test against the greater impact
from passing a tougher test.
As seems reasonable in this context, a bad type of principal can costlessly duplicate the choice of test
chosen by a good principal. As a result, all of our outcomes will be pooling, and there will be no issues
of incentive compatibility or scope for a separating equilibrium. Therefore the choice of a tough test
does not have the advantage of signaling the type of principal. Without a role for signaling by choice
of test, we might assume that since an easy test is by deﬁn i t i o nt h em o s tl i k e l yt ob ep a s s e d ,i tm u s t
naturally be the ﬁrst choice for any principal. However tough tests have two innate advantages. They
generate a stronger impact on agents in the event of a pass, and they are less damaging in the event of
af a i l .W eﬁnd that the principal will always choose to be tested, and perhaps surprisingly will prefer a
tough test to a neutral or easy one despite the lack of an immediate signaling advantage through the
choice of test.2
1.1. Related Literature. The paper most closely related to ours is Lerner and Tirole’s (2004) recent
(and independently developed) paper concerning the role of technology standard setting authorities
as certiﬁers.3 Along with Lerner and Tirole, our paper is the ﬁrst to consider a principal seeking
an initial public endorsement who can choose from amongst a continuum of tests of varying bias or
toughness. Similarly to our tests, Lerner and Tirole’s certiﬁers have an arbitrary bias towards the
technology sponsor which determines their endorsement rule. The model has signiﬁcant diﬀerences to
ours. Crucially, Lerner and Tirole do not allow consumers to either receive any private information or
observe other agents’ actions. Furthermore, the sponsor is not perfectly informed about quality and the
chosen certiﬁer discovers with certainty the quality of the technology it is asked to review. As certiﬁers
cannot overwhelm bad private information or trigger cascades, Lerner and Tirole do not ﬁnd any role
for certiﬁers biased against the technology. Instead they ﬁnd the somewhat unsurprising result that
the sponsor prefers the certiﬁer most biased in favor of the new technology on oﬀer, subject to users
adopting following a positive decision by the certiﬁer.
In a model with sequential sales, Sgroi (2002) examines the use of small groups of consumers who
are encouraged to decide early, acting as “guinea pigs” and providing additional information for later
consumers. Sgroi’s paper is similar to ours in that in both cases the principal is able to manipulate
herd probabilities to her advantage. However, the method of manipulation and basic trade-oﬀ in Sgroi
are quite diﬀerent to the ones analyzed here. In Sgroi, there is no notion of bias or toughness. Instead,
the principal is able to manipulate the structure of agents’ decision-making, trading oﬀ a delay in the
start of the herd against a greater chance that the herd ends up moving in a favorable direction. In
this paper, in contrast, the sequence of agent decisions is assumed ﬁxed, while the principal chooses a
tough public test to try to start an immediate herd on passing, trading this oﬀ against a higher chance
of failing the test.
Taylor (1999) and Bose et al. (2005) ﬁnd that high prices can be optimal in a similar way to tough
tests in this paper. In Bose et al., if an expensive good becomes successful, this conveys strong positive
information to later buyers. Taylor, concentrating on the housing market, ﬁnds a high price to be
optimal as a failure to sell a house early can then be attributed to overpricing rather than low quality.
Our work should be contrasted with the literature on self-interested experts, who manipulate the
messages they send about the true state of the world (see chapter 10 of Chamley (2004) for a survey).
Our tests are purely mechanical: the level of toughness is ﬁxed and commonly known. Our work is also
diﬀerent from the literature on payment structures to certiﬁcation intermediaries, where the question
is how intermediaries aﬀect the quality chosen by the ﬁrm (e.g., Albano and Lizzeri, 2001). In our
3Chiao et al. (2005) empirically test Lerner and Tirole’s model, while Farhi et al. (2005) extend the model to a dynamic
setting.3
model, quality is ﬁxed. Finally, our analysis is diﬀerent from Ottaviani and Prat (2001), who ﬁnd that
a monopolist may wish to use a public signal of quality such as an outside certiﬁer. Our principal is
informed about her type, while in Ottaviani and Prat both the buyer and seller are uninformed, so a
public signal aﬃliated with the buyer’s private information reduces the buyer’s informational rents in a
second-degree price discrimination setting.
2. The Model
A risk-neutral principal, whose objective is to maximize the number of endorsements from a sequence
of agents, may be good or bad for the agents. The principal knows her type, but the agents do not,
and there is no easy means of truthful revelation. A stream of agents of uncertain length act in an
exogenously ordered sequence, choosing an action Ai ∈ {Y,N} where Y denotes an endorsement and
N a rejection. This “endorsement” is a general concept which could, for example, encompass adopting
some new technology, voting for a candidate in an election, purchasing a product, watching a movie,
making a job oﬀer etc.4 After each agent decides, the sequence of agents comes to an end with probability
1 − θ ∈ (0,1), so the expected number of agents is 1
1−θ.5 Introducing this uncertainty, as opposed to a
sequence of determinate length as in the standard Bikhchandani et al. (1992) herding model, allows us
to use a recursive solution method, greatly simplifying the analysis in the presence of the asymmetries
introduced by the choice of biased tests. The payoﬀ to an agent from Y is V which has prior probability
1
2 of returning 1 or −1, depending on whether the principal is a good or bad type, while the payoﬀ from
N is 0, leaving agents indiﬀerent before additional information is obtained. The agents each receive a
conditionally independent signal about V deﬁned as Xi ∈ {H,L} for agent i. The signals are informative
but not fully revealing in the sense that:
Pr[Xi = H | V =1 ] = P r[ Xi = L | V = −1] = p ∈
¡1
2,1
¢
Pr[Xi = H | V = −1] = Pr[Xi = L | V =1 ] = 1− p ∈
¡
0, 1
2
¢
Before facing the stream of agents, the principal can opt to be publicly tested. We want to think of
the test as by its very nature accessing ﬁner information about the principal’s type than a single typical
private signal. The simplest way of modeling this is to allow the test to involve the draw of two i.i.d.
signals from the same distribution as agents. The test generates a binary decision d ∈ {P,F} whether to
4In many speciﬁc cases we might need to add more content to the model such as prices in an industrial organization
context, a voting rule in a political economy context, etc. We wish to leave this open, but the addition of such features is
straightforward. See Gill and Sgroi (2004) for a speciﬁc application to purchasing decisions with ﬂexible prices, though in
a simultaneous sales context.
5E q u i v a l e n t l y ,t h es e q u e n c ei si n ﬁnite and the principal discounts at a rate θ. If the principal is attempting to sell a product,
push a new technology or advance a particular policy then 1 − θ may represent a measure of how quickly the principal
expects a rival product, technology or policy to be developed which will make her own obsolete.4
pass (P) or fail (F) the principal. Modeling an evaluation as condensing more complex information into
a simple binary decision follows for example Calvert (1985) and Sah and Stiglitz (1986).6 We consider
a continuum of test types: tests are passed with a signal draw of HH, pass with probability φ ∈ [0,1]
on a draw of HL or LH and fail on a draw of LL. The value of φ encapsulates the type of the test. The
lower the value of φ, the tougher the test.
Deﬁnition 1. Tests with φ ∈ [0, 1
2) are termed “tough”, those with φ ∈ (1
2,1] “easy”, and those with
φ = 1
2, which pass on a coin ﬂip on observing a set of mixed signals, “neutral”.
The toughness of a particular test is common knowledge, perhaps generated through a known history
of pass or fail decisions, and the principal is able to choose the test type. We have left the notion of test
fairly abstract, but depending on the application, the choice of test might consist of a choice between
diﬀerent reviewers, interviewers, referees, accreditation bodies and so on.
Agent i will observe the choice of test, the test result, the actions of his predecessors Hi−1 ≡
{A1,...,A i−1} and his private signal, and will endorse if E [V | φ,d,Hi−1,X i] > 0. Where E [V ]=0 ,
the agent ﬂips a fair coin.7 The sequential ordering allows agents to learn from each other’s decisions
as well as from the result of the test, combining this information with their own private signals. Po-
tentially, more information may be transmitted to agents later in the sequence. However, agents may
fall into an informational cascade in the sense of Bikhchandani et al. (1992), where public information
swamps private information. Once a given agent in the sequence rationally disregards his own private
information, nothing further is revealed to later agents who will then also all disregard their private
information and copy the choice of their predecessor agent. Of course there is no reason for a principal
to stay passive in the face of such potential cascades, and by selecting a suitable test the principal can
hope to raise the chance of a cascade in her favor and diminish the chance of a cascade going against
her.
Throughout, for conciseness, we consider just the good type of principal. By standard signaling
considerations, a bad type of principal will be forced to copy the choice of the good type to avoid
immediately revealing type and so receive no endorsements. A separating equilibrium is not possible, as
the bad type would copy the choice of the good principal, and so be believed to be good and obtain the
same outcome as the good type (receiving endorsements from all agents). Thus, we restrict attention
to pooling equilibria in which the bad type of principal is forced to follow the good type’s preference.
6As Calvert puts it (p. 534): “This feature represents the basic nature of advice, a distillation of complex reality into a
simple recommendation.”
7Coin ﬂipping is the standard tie-break rule used in herding models. See for example Bikhchandani et al. (1992).
Equivalently each agent may be following a ﬁxed selection rule, so long as in expectation half of indiﬀerent agents endorse
the principal and half do not. Banerjee (1992) instead uses a “follow your own signal” rule, but does this speciﬁcally to
minimize the chance of a herd.5
Such equilibria can always be supported by the belief that any principal who deviates from the good
type’s preferences must be a bad type. Note that in such pooling equilibria, agents will be unable to
infer anything about the type of the principal from the principal’s choice of test, and so will have to
rely on observing the outcome of the test to provide additional information about the principal’s type.
All omitted proofs can be found in the Appendix.
3. Agent Learning
Observing the choice of test, the test result and the actions of his predecessors, agent i will be able
to update his prior belief that the principal is good from 1
2 to qi ≡ Pr[V =1| φ,d,Hi−1]. We start by
deriving two remarks, which are used implicitly throughout.
Remark 1. Given his private signal Xi and updated prior qi, agent i Bayes updates as follows:
Pr[V =1 |Xi]
Pr[V = −1|Xi]
=
Pr[Xi|V =1]Pr[V =1]
Pr[Xi]
Pr[Xi|V =−1]Pr[V =−1]
Pr[Xi]
=
Pr[Xi|V =1 ]qi
Pr[Xi|V = −1](1 − qi)
Remark 2. When calculating beliefs, agents can cancel and ignore opposing H and L signals.
We can now determine agent i0s endorsement decision.
Lemma 1. The ith agent will respond to an updated prior as follows: (a) if qi >pthen i will endorse; (b)
if qi = p, following a H signal i endorses, while following a L signal, he ﬂips a coin; (c) if qi ∈ (1 − p,p)
then i will endorse if and only if Xi = H;( d )i fqi =1− p, following a H signal i ﬂips a coin, while
following a L signal he rejects; (e) if qi < 1 − p then i rejects.
Where qi is strongly positive or negative, it outweighs any possible private signal agent i might receive,
leading to a cascade. Where qi >p ,from Lemma 1 agent i endorses whatever the signal received. The
decision is thus uninformative, so agent i+1also endorses, and so on. A symmetrical argument applies
where qi < 1 − p.
Lemma 2. Where qi >p ,we have a cascade on endorsement, i.e., agent i and all subsequent agents
endorse. Where qi < 1 − p, we have a cascade on rejection, i.e., agent i and all subsequent agents fail
to endorse.
N e x t ,w ed e t e r m i n eh o wd i ﬀerent test results impact on the ﬁrst agent’s beliefs. The updated prior
faced by the ﬁrst agent in the event of a pass (denoted by q1 = qP) and a fail (denoted by q1 = qF)w i l l
be as follows:
qP ≡ Pr[V =1| Pass]= [p2+2p(1−p)φ]
[p2+2p(1−p)φ]+[(1−p)2+2(1−p)pφ] =
p2+2p(1−p)φ
p2+(1−p)2+4p(1−p)φ
qF ≡ Pr[V =1| Fail]= [(1−p)2+2p(1−p)(1−φ)]
[(1−p)2+2p(1−p)(1−φ)]+[p2+2(1−p)p(1−φ)] =
(1−p)2+2p(1−p)(1−φ)
(1−p)2+p2+4p(1−p)(1−φ)6
Note that:
dqP
dφ
=
2p(1−p)[p2+(1−p)2+4p(1−p)φ]−4p(1−p)[p2+2p(1−p)φ]
[p2+(1−p)2+4p(1−p)φ]
2 =
2p(1−p)(1−2p)
[p2+(1−p)2+4p(1−p)φ]
2 < 0
dqF
dφ
=
−2p(1−p)[(1−p)2+p2+4p(1−p)(1−φ)]+4p(1−p)[(1−p)2+2p(1−p)(1−φ)]
[(1−p)2+p2+4p(1−p)(1−φ)]
2 =
2p(1−p)(1−2p)
[(1−p)2+p2+4p(1−p)(1−φ)]
2 < 0
That the updated priors should be decreasing in φ is perfectly natural: a pass is better news the
tougher the test, while a fail is not such bad news. Using this, we can derive:
Lemma 3. (a) qP
¡
φ<1
2
¢
>p ; (b) qP
¡
φ = 1
2
¢
= p; (c) qP
¡
φ>1
2
¢
∈
¡1
2,p
¢
;( d )qF
¡
φ<1
2
¢
∈
¡
1 − p, 1
2
¢
; (e) qF
¡
φ = 1
2
¢
=1− p; (f) qF
¡
φ>1
2
¢
< 1 − p.
Together with Lemma 1, Lemma 3 shows how the test determines the ﬁrst agent’s decision.
4. Choice of Test
In the previous section, we calculated the eﬀect of diﬀerent test results on q1; now we calculate the
expected number of endorsements, π, for the good type of principal ∀q1. From Lemma 2, q1 >pleads
to an immediate cascade on endorsement, so πq1>p = 1
1−θ,w h i l eq1 < (1 − p) leads to an immediate
cascade on rejection, so πq1<1−p =0 . The following lemma uses a recursive solution to the appropriate
decision trees. Note that in cases (ii) and (iii) π is independent of the speciﬁc q1 value.
Lemma 4. For a good principal,
(i) πq1=1
2 =
p[2−(1−p)θ2]
2[1−p(1−p)θ2](1−θ) (4.1)
(ii) πq1∈(1
2,p) =
p[1+(1−p)θ(1−θ)]
[1−p(1−p)θ2](1−θ) (4.2)
(iii) πq1∈(1−p, 1
2) =
p[p+(1−p)(1−θ)]
[1−p(1−p)θ2](1−θ) (4.3)
Now suppose q1 = p. From Lemma 1 if the ﬁrst agent gets a positive signal he endorses, while if he
gets a negative signal this exactly cancels the positive prior so he is indiﬀerent and ﬂips a coin. We can
think of the second and subsequent agents as starting a new sequence with updated prior q2. If the ﬁrst
agent rejects, later agents infer X1 = L, so q2 = 1
2. If the ﬁrst endorses, then he is more likely to have
observed H than L, sending a positive signal, thus increasing q2 above q1, so q2 >p . 8 Thus,
(4.4) πq1=p =
£
p + 1
2(1 − p)
¤³
1
1−θ
´
+ 1
2(1 − p)θπq1=1
2
Suppose instead q1 =1− p. This case is the symmetric opposite. If the ﬁrst agent gets a L signal,
he rejects, while if he gets a H signal, this exactly cancels the negative prior so he ﬂips a coin. Thus, if
8Formally,
q2
1−q2 =
Pr[V =1|A1=Y ]
Pr[V =−1|A1=Y ] =
p+ 1
2(1−p)
(1−p)+ 1
2p
q1
1−q1 >
q1
1−q1.7
the ﬁrst agent endorses, later agents infer X1 = H, so q2 = 1
2. If the ﬁrst rejects, then he is more likely
to have observed L than H, sending a negative signal, so q2 < 1 − p. Thus,
(4.5) πq1=1−p = 1
2p
³
1+θπq1=1
2
´
Of course, πq1>p >π q1=p >π q1∈(1
2,p) >π q1=1
2 >π q1∈(1−p, 1
2) >π q1=1−p >π q1<1−p.
We now have the building blocks which allow us to easily calculate and compare the expected number
of endorsements for the principal from choosing diﬀerent test types, Π[φ]. Suppose ﬁrst that the test
is neutral. Then, using Lemma 3 and the fact that Pr[P]=p2 +2 p(1 − p)φ while Pr[F]=( 1− p)2 +
2p(1 − p)(1 − φ):
(4.6) Π
£
φ = 1
2
¤
=P r [ P]πq1=p +P r[ F]πq1=1−p = pπq1=p +( 1− p)πq1=1−p
With a tough test, using Lemmas 2 and 3, a pass starts an immediate cascade on endorsement with
q1 >p ,w h i l eaf a i ll e a v e sq1 ∈ (1 − p, 1
2). Thus:
(4.7) Π
£
φ ∈ [0, 1
2)
¤
=
©
p2 +2 p(1 − p)φ
ª
πq1>p +
©
(1 − p)2 +2 p(1 − p)(1 − φ)
ª
πq1∈(1−p, 1
2)
Note that
d(Π[φ∈[0,1
2)])
dφ > 0 as πq1>p and πq1∈(1−p,1
2) are constant in φ, πq1>p >π q1∈(1−p, 1
2) and
dPr[P]
dφ =
−
dPr[F]
dφ > 0.
Finally, we consider an easy test. This case is the symmetric opposite of the tough test case. Using
Lemmas 2 and 3, a fail starts an immediate cascade on rejection as q1 < 1 − p, while a pass sends a
positive signal weaker than the one sent out when a neutral test is passed, so q1 ∈ (1
2,p), giving:
(4.8) Π
£
φ ∈ (1
2,1]
¤
=
©
p2 +2 p(1 − p)φ
ª
πq1∈(1
2,p)
Comparing the diﬀerent expected number of endorsements, we ﬁnd the following proposition.
Proposition 1. For any choice of three test types φ ∈
©
φT, 1
2,φ E
ª
such that φT ∈ [0, 1
2) and φE ∈
(1
2,1], the good type of principal strictly prefers the tough test φT to the neutral test φ = 1
2 a n dt ot h e
easy test φE.
Despite the fact that tough tests are less likely to be passed, the good principal prefers any tough test
to any neutral or easy one. She prefers tough tests because of the strong impact on agents’ decisions
from a pass, which leads to a cascade on endorsement, while a fail in a tough test is not too costly as
the test is known to be tough, diluting the impact of failure on agents’ beliefs.
Next we deﬁne the concept of  -optimization.8
Deﬁnition 2. To  -optimize Π over a range of φ values, Ω ⊆ [0,1], means to select a φ ∈ Ω such that
Π > sup
φ∈Ω
Π −  .
The following lemma follows from the fact that
d(Π[φ∈[0,1
2)])
dφ > 0,s osup
φ<1
2
Π = pπq1>p+(1−p)πq1∈(1−p, 1
2).
Lemma 5. For any  >0 the principal can  -optimize over φ ∈ [0, 1
2) by selecting φ suﬃciently close
to 1
2, thus achieving Π > sup
φ< 1
2
Π −  .
Informally, the lemma says that the optimal tough test is one whose toughness is arbitrarily mild
(i.e., with φ strictly below but arbitrarily close to 1
2).
Proposition 1 tells us that any tough type of test beats the neutral test or any easy type of test,
which implies that sup
φ∈[0,1]
Π =s u p
φ<1
2
Π. Together with Lemma 5 this gives:
Proposition 2. For any  >0 the principal can  -optimize over φ ∈ [0,1] by selecting φ suﬃciently
close to but below 1
2, thus achieving Π > sup
φ∈[0,1]
Π −  .
Informally, the optimal test type is a tough test which has arbitrarily mild toughness. A pass in any
tough type of test leads to an immediate cascade on endorsement, so the principal prefers a tough test
that is as close as possible to the neutral test type so as to maximize the probability of a pass.9
Finally, we ﬁnd that the neutral test is strictly preferred to no test at all. The signal arising from the
neutral test allows some information transmission through the sequence of agents which, in expectation,
is valuable to the good type of principal.
Proposition 3. The choice of taking no test is strictly worse than taking the neutral type of test φ = 1
2
and a fortiori strictly worse than a tough test type.
9For analytical tractability, we have chosen a simple binary signal structure. Though beyond the scope of this paper,
one might wonder to what extent our results carry over to a richer signal space. Our model crucially depends on the
possibility of cascades, which are manipulated by the principal. As is well understood in the herding literature (see Smith
and Sorensen, 2000), cascades require that the strength of private signals be bounded. With unbounded signals, any public
belief can be overwhelmed by a strong enough signal, so herds can always be broken and beliefs must eventually converge
to the truth. Thus, our results would not extend to Gaussian continuous signals (see Chamley, 2004, p. 27). However, we
conjecture that our main intuition that tough tests are best would hold under a richer discrete bounded signal space, as
the principal should still want to risk a tough test to try to get an early favorable cascade started. The principal could
then choose a test just tougher than that required to make an agent with the worst possible signal indiﬀerent conditional
on the test being passed. However, if such extreme signals are suﬃciently unlikely, we conjecture that the principal will
instead choose a somewhat weaker tough test to give a high, but not certain, chance of an immediate favorable cascade
in the event of a pass. The fact that a pass by a test   tougher than a fair one outweighs the worst possible signal is
speciﬁc to the simple binary signal case. More generally the principal will still be  -optimizing in that for whichever signal
is targeted as the endorse threshold conditional on a pass, the test needs to be   tougher than the one giving indiﬀerence
with that signal. With a continuum of bounded signals, the property of  -optimization will disappear, unless the principal
targets the worst possible signal.9
The following two ﬁgures illustrate the size of the increase in the expected number of endorsements
from opting to face a tough test. Figure 1 shows the percentage increase in the expected number of
endorsements from taking the toughest test over a neutral test, which peaks at 25%, while Figure 2
shows the percentage increase from using the tough test type which is almost neutral, which peaks at
50%.
Figure 1:
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5. Conclusion
Within the model presented in which test toughness is tightly deﬁned, as are the available sources
of information for agents, we ﬁnd that a principal of type unknown to a sequence of agents should seek
to face a public test if this is possible. Furthermore, that principal should seek out the mildest form of
tough test available. If there are only very tough tests, then those are the ones that should be selected.
Tests that are relatively easy are not optimal, as they provide too damaging a signal in the event of a
fail, and too little gain in the event of a pass. Converting these results into practical normative advice,
job applicants might consider resisting the temptation to approach relatively soft referees. Firms should
avoid “yes men” reviewers for their products. A politician should consider opting to select where to be
interviewed, or where to leak new policies, based on the simple premise of ﬁrst ruling out optimistic or
positively biased journalists and then selecting the mildest of those who are intrinsically biased against
the politician and his policies. At a descriptive level, we have an explanation for the existence of tough
tests, biased newspapers, tough referees, etc. that have a well known harsh or overly critical style, and
yet are regularly chosen. When selecting a test to take, a reviewer to observe your product, a referee
to provide a letter of recommendation or an interviewer to face, the old Roman proverb is perhaps the
best summary of our ﬁndings: fortune favors the brave.10
Appendix
P r o o fo fR e m a r k2 .Suppose the agent starts with a prior z and observes or infers an information set
Ii. Now suppose that instead of Ii, the agent infers I+
i , which we deﬁne as the set Ii plus a further H
a n dt h e naL signal. Then, using Remark 1 (replacing qi with z),
Pr[V =1|I
+
i ]
Pr[V =−1|I+
i ] =
Pr[I
+
i |V =1]z
Pr[I+
i |V =−1](1−z) =
Pr[Ii|V =1]p(1−p)z
Pr[Ii|V =−1](1−p)p(1−z) =
Pr[V =1|Ii]
Pr[V =−1|Ii]. ¤
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .Where qi >p ,the ith agent will endorse. Agent i is least likely to endorse if Xi = L.
Taking this case, we have an odds ratio
Pr[V =1|L]
Pr[V =−1|L] =
(1−p)qi
p(1−qi) =
qi−pqi
p−pqi > 1 since qi >p .As y m m e t r i c a l
argument shows that where qi < 1 − p, agent i will reject. Where qi ∈ (1 − p,p), following a H signal
Pr[V =1|H]
Pr[V =−1|H] =
pqi
(1−p)(1−qi) > 1 as qi > (1−p),s oi endorses. Following a L signal
Pr[V =1|L]
Pr[V =−1|L] =
(1−p)qi
p(1−qi) < 1
as qi <p ,so i rejects. Where qi = p, following a L signal,
Pr[V =1|L]
Pr[V =−1|L] =
(1−p)qi
p(1−qi) =1as qi = p, so the agent
is indiﬀerent and ﬂips a coin. A H signal is more positive, so the agent endorses. By symmetry, where
qi =1− p, following a H signal the agent ﬂips a coin, while following a L signal the agent rejects. ¤
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 .With a neutral test, so setting φ = 1
2, we have:
qP
¡
φ = 1
2
¢
=
p2+p(1−p)
p2+(1−p)2+2p(1−p) = p
qF
¡
φ = 1
2
¢
=
(1−p)2+p(1−p)
(1−p)2+p2+2p(1−p) =1− p
As qP and qF are both strictly decreasing in φ, this immediately implies that qP
¡
φ<1
2
¢
>p ,
qP
¡
φ>1
2
¢
<p ,q F
¡
φ<1
2
¢
> 1 − p and qF
¡
φ>1
2
¢
< 1 − p. Furthermore, qP (φ =1 ) > 1
2 and
qF (φ =0 )< 1
2 :
qP (φ =1 ) =
p2+2p(1−p)
p2+(1−p)2+4p(1−p) > 1
2 ⇔ p2 > (1 − p)
2
qF (φ =0 ) =
(1−p)2+2p(1−p)
(1−p)2+p2+4p(1−p) < 1
2 ⇔ (1 − p)
2 <p 2
Using the fact that qP and qF are both strictly decreasing in φ, it follows that qP > 1
2 and qF < 1
2
∀φ. ¤
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 .(i) q1 = 1
2. The ﬁrst agent will follow his signal, i.e., will endorse iﬀ X1 = H. Suppose
the ﬁrst agent endorses. This reveals his signal to be H to the second agent. If the second agent also
gets a H signal, he therefore also endorses, but if he gets a L signal the H and L signals cancel, so he
is indiﬀerent and ﬂips a coin. If the third agent observes two endorse decisions, a cascade on endorse
starts. If he gets X3 = L, his signal and that of the ﬁrst agent cancel, but because the second agent
endorsed, he is more likely to have observed X2 = H than X2 = L. Formally, for the third agent
Pr[V =1|A2=Y ]
Pr[V =−1|A2=Y ] =
p+1
2(1−p)
(1−p)+ 1
2p > 1. Thus the third agent endorses if he receives a bad signal, and a fortiori
endorses with a good signal, so a cascade on endorse has started.11
Suppose instead that the ﬁrst agent endorses, but the second agent rejects. Then the third agent can
infer {X1 = H, X2 = L}. These two signals cancel, so the third agent is in exactly the same situation
as the ﬁrst agent before he received a signal.
T h ec a s ew h e r et h eﬁrst agent rejects is the symmetric opposite. If the second agent also rejects, a
cascade on reject starts. If the second agent endorses, then the third agent is back to exactly the same
situation as the ﬁrst agent. All this can be illustrated in the following decision tree:10
2nd Agent Rejects: {H} or {L}
(1/2).p + (1-p)
1st Agent Rejects: {L}
3rd Agent Like 1st
2nd Agent Endorses: {H}
Cascade on Reject
(1/2).p
1st Agent Endorses: {H}
2nd Agent Endorses: {H} or {L}
Cascade on Endorse
2nd Agent Rejects: {L}
3rd Agent Like 1st
p + (1/2).(1-p) (1/2).(1-p)
p
1-p
2nd Agent Rejects: {H} or {L}
(1/2).p + (1-p)
1st Agent Rejects: {L}
3rd Agent Like 1st
2nd Agent Endorses: {H}
Cascade on Reject
(1/2).p
1st Agent Endorses: {H}
2nd Agent Endorses: {H} or {L}
Cascade on Endorse
2nd Agent Rejects: {L}
3rd Agent Like 1st
p + (1/2).(1-p) (1/2).(1-p)
p
1-p
p
1-p
We can use this tree to calculate the expected number of endorsements for the principal in this case by
ﬁnding the expected endorsements down various branches of the tree and multiplying by the probability
of the relevant branch. Note that we have a recursive structure, whereby the expected number of
endorsements from various points further down the tree are equivalent to those from points higher up
in the tree. Letting πq1=1
2 be the expected number of endorsements at the beginning of the tree, we get:
πq1=1
2 = p
£
p + 1
2(1 − p)
¤³
1
1−θ
´
+ p
£1
2(1 − p)
¤³
1+θ2πq1=1
2
´
+( 1− p)(1
2p)
³
θ + θ2πq1=1
2
´
which solves to give the value for πq1=1
2 in the lemma.
(ii) q1 ∈ (1
2,p). F r o mL e m m a1t h eﬁrst agent will endorse iﬀ X1 = H. Following endorsement by the
ﬁrst agent, a cascade on endorse starts. The second agent can infer that the ﬁrst one got a H signal.
Thus, q2 =
pq1
pq1+(1−p)(1−q1) >pas q1 >p q 1 +1− p − q1 + pq1 iﬀ 2q1(1 − p) > 1 − p or q1 > 1
2, which of
course we have assumed. Hence by Lemma 2 a cascade on endorse starts.
10Remember that the principal knows it is a good type. The branch probabilities are predicated upon this assumption.12
If the ﬁrst agent rejects, then the second agent endorses iﬀ X2 = H. The second agent can infer
X1 = L, so if X2 = H, the two signals cancel, and hence the second agent endorses as q1 > 1
2.I f
X2 = L, then the agent has eﬀectively seen two negative signals, and so rejects given the ﬁrst agent
with a single negative signal does so.
Following rejection by the ﬁrst agent, and an endorsement by the second, the third agent can infer
a L and a H signal, which cancel leaving him in exactly the same position as the ﬁrst agent before he
received a signal.
Following rejection by the ﬁrst two agents, a cascade on reject starts. If the third agent receives a H
signal, this cancels one of the two inferred L signals, so the agent is left with just one L signal which,
just as for the ﬁrst agent with L, leads to rejection. A fortiori, he also rejects if he receives a L signal.
All this information can be summarized in the following decision tree, with branch probabilities
conditional on the principal being the good type.
1st Agent Endorses: {H} 1st Agent Rejects: {L}
2nd Agent Endorses: {H} 2nd Agent Rejects: {L}
Cascade on Reject
Cascade on Endorse
3rd Agent Like 1st
p1 - p
p1 - p
1st Agent Endorses: {H} 1st Agent Rejects: {L}
2nd Agent Endorses: {H} 2nd Agent Rejects: {L}
Cascade on Reject
Cascade on Endorse Cascade on Endorse
3rd Agent Like 1st 3rd Agent Like 1st
p1 - p
p1 - p
Thus, for any speciﬁc q1 ∈ (1
2,p), we can ﬁnd expected number of endorsements for the good type of
principal,
πq1∈(1
2,p) = p
³
1
1−θ
´
+( 1− p)p
h
θ + θ2πq1∈(1
2,p)
i
which solves to give the value for πq1∈(1
2,p) in the lemma.
(iii) q1 ∈ (1 − p, 1
2). The shape of the decision tree, which is determined by agents who do not know
the type of principal, will be the symmetric opposite of the one in case (ii). A L signal starts a cascade
on reject, just like before a H signal started a cascade on endorse, while two H signals start a cascade
on endorse, just like before two L signals started a cascade on reject. If the ﬁrst agent endorses but the
second does not, the inferred signals cancel. Thus, for any speciﬁc q1 ∈ (1 − p, 1
2),
πq1∈(1−p, 1
2) = p2
³
1
1−θ
´
+ p(1 − p)
h
1+θ2πq1∈(1−p, 1
2)
i
which solves to give the value for πq1∈(1
2,p) in the lemma. ¤13
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .To show that any φT ∈ [0, 1
2) gives a larger number of expected endorsements
than φ = 1
2 we simply need to show that Π[φ =0 ]> Π
£
φ = 1
2
¤
, given
d(Π[φ∈[0,1
2)])
dφ > 0. Using (4.7),
(4.3) and Lemma 2, Π[φ =0 ]=p2
³
1
1−θ
´
+
¡
1 − p2¢ p[p+(1−p)(1−θ)]
[1−p(1−p)θ2](1−θ), which simpliﬁes to:
(A.1) Π[φ =0 ]=
p[1+p(1−p)+p2(1−p)θ(1−θ)−(1−p)θ]
[1−p(1−p)θ2](1−θ)
From (4.6), Π
£
φ = 1
2
¤
= pπq1=p +( 1− p)πq1=1−p. Thus, using (4.4), (4.5) and (4.1):
Π
£
φ = 1
2
¤
= p
£
p + 1
2(1 − p)
¤³
1
1−θ
´
+ p1
2(1 − p)θ
p[2−(1−p)θ2]
2[1−p(1−p)θ2](1−θ) +( 1− p)1
2p
µ
1+θ
p[2−(1−p)θ2]
2[1−p(1−p)θ2](1−θ)
¶
which simpliﬁes to
(A.2) Π
£
φ = 1
2
¤
=
p[2+2p(1−p)θ(1−θ)−(1−p)θ]
2[1−p(1−p)θ2](1−θ)
From (A.1) and (A.2),
Π[φ =0 ]− Π
£
φ = 1
2
¤
=
p[2+2p(1−p)+2p2(1−p)θ(1−θ)−2(1−p)θ]−p[2+2p(1−p)θ(1−θ)−(1−p)θ]
2[1−p(1−p)θ2](1−θ)
∴ Π[φ =0 ]− Π
£
φ = 1
2
¤
=
p(1−p)[2p+2p2θ(1−θ)−θ−2pθ(1−θ)]
2[1−p(1−p)θ2](1−θ)
The denominator is strictly positive, as is p(1 − p), so to show Π[φ =0 ]> Π
£
φ = 1
2
¤
we just need to
show that 2p+2p2θ(1 − θ)−θ−2pθ(1−θ) > 0.T h u s ,as u ﬃcient condition is that 2p−θ−2pθ(1−θ) > 0.
This hold iﬀ 2p[1 − θ(1 − θ)] >θ .But 2p>1, so a further suﬃcient condition is that 1−θ(1−θ) >θ ,
or (θ − 1)
2 > 0, which is clearly true.
Our ﬁnal task is to show that φT ∈ [0, 1
2) gives a larger number of expected endorsements than
φE ∈ (1
2,1]. From (4.8), Π
£
φ ∈ (1
2,1]
¤
=
©
p2 +2 p(1 − p)φ
ª
πq1∈(1
2,p). Now,
d(Π[φ∈(1
2,1]])
dφ > 0 as Pr[P]=
©
p2 +2 p(1 − p)φ
ª
is strictly increasing in φ and from (4.2), πq1∈(1
2,p) is constant in φ. Thus, we simply
need to show that Π[φ =0 ]> Π[φ =1 ]. Using (4.2):
(A.3) Π[φ =1 ]=
£
p2 +2 p(1 − p)
¤ p[1+(1−p)θ(1−θ)]
[1−p(1−p)θ2](1−θ)
Using (A.1) and (A.3), we can derive
Π[φ =0 ]− Π[φ =1 ]=
p(1−p)(1−θ)[1−2p(1−p)θ]
[1−p(1−p)θ2](1−θ)
The denominator is strictly positive, as is p(1 − p)(1 − θ), so the sign of Π[φ =0 ]− Π[φ =1 ]and
1 − 2p(1 − p)θ must be the same. Now, since p>1
2,i tm u s tb et h a tp(1 − p) < 1
4,s o2p(1 − p)θ must
always remain smaller than a half. Thus, 1 − 2p(1 − p)θ>0. ¤14
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .With no test, the ﬁrst agent’s q1 equals the prior belief 1
2. Therefore, Π[No Test]
= πq1=1
2. Thus, using (4.1) and (A.2), Π
£
φ = 1
2
¤
> Π[No Test] iﬀ:
2+2 p(1 − p)θ(1 − θ) − (1 − p)θ>2 − (1 − p)θ2 ⇔ 2p(1 − θ) − 1 > −θ ⇔ (2p − 1)(1 − θ) > 0
which holds. ¤
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